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Two Essays on Corporate Governance⎯ Are Local Directors Better Monitors,
and Directors Incentives and Earnings Management
Hong Wan
ABSTRACT
Previous literature have documented that the independent directors play a crucial
goal in corporate governance but the research on the firm value and board independence
remains inconclusive. In my dissertation, I examine the impact of independent directors’
geographic proximity to corporate headquarters on the effectiveness of corporate boards and
the motivations of board directors. Using a large sample of directors trading, I show that
independent directors who live close to headquarters (“local director”) earn higher abnormal
returns on their trades than other directors, and that this advantage is stronger in small firms.
Further, I find an inverse relationship between the number of local independent directors on
the board and firm value. Companies with fewer local independent directors also have higher
ROA ratios, lower abnormal CEO compensations, and higher CEO incentive compensations.
Collectively, the findings suggest that local independent directors are more informed but less
effective monitors. I also provided evidence that firms with a higher proportion of directors’
incentive compensation are more likely to manage earnings. Directors are more likely to
exercise options in the year following the firms’ earnings management being in the top

v

tercile of the sample. The results are robust after controlling for self-selection bias. Taken
together, the evidence suggests that director incentive pay is more likely to align directors’
interest with the CEO’s, rather than to induce the directors to act in the best interest of the
shareholders.

vi

Essay 1⎯ Are Local Directors Better Monitors
Introduction
Board independence is an important mechanism of corporate governance.
Independent directors are elected to oversee the managers and act in the best interests of
stockholders. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) focus on the outside directors’ role
as monitors and emphasize that independent directors have incentives to build their
reputation as expert monitors. Since then, a series of corporate scandals have led to changes
in laws and regulations that are aimed at enhancing board independence.
According to the National Association of Corporate Directors, in 2005, 83% of
boards consisted of a majority of independent directors, up from 54% in 2000. However, in
spite of the crucial function of independent directors as monitors, the evidence on the
relationship between board independence and firm value remains inconclusive. For example,
Aggrawal and Willamson (2006) find that the fraction of independent directors on the board
has a positive impact on firm’s Q. However, Hermalin and Wissbach (1991) show an
insignificant relationship between board independence and firm performance, while
Yermack (1996), Klein (1998), and Bhagat and Black (2002) find a negative relationship.
Two possible reasons for the mixed evidence have been suggested in the literature.
First, it is unclear what constitutes director independence. The literature defines independent
directors by their affiliation. However, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and others argue that
being unaffiliated does not necessarily mean being independent. Second, while the board’s
function is to monitor the CEOs, the CEO most always determines the agenda of board
meetings and the information given to the board (Jensen (1993)). Consequently he may be
1

able to keep the board in the dark whenever he wants to make decisions that may harm the
shareholders. Adams and Ferreira (2007) also present a model wherein the CEO is less likely
to share information with directors when the board is monitoring intensively.
To shed new light on this issue, I examine board effectiveness by considering a new
dimension of board independence: proximity of board members to the corporate
headquarters, and hence to the CEOs. My primary focus in this paper is on the relationship
between geographic proximity of independent directors and board effectiveness. I propose
two contending hypotheses to explain this association. The first proposes that board
effectiveness rises with the proportion of the board that is made up of local independent
directors (“local director”). I call this the efficiency hypothesis. An alternative hypothesis is
that local directors, because of their proximity to the firm’s CEO and other executives, may
be less effective monitors. In other words, more geographically proximate directors may be
less objective and hence reduces board effectiveness. I call this the entrenchment hypothesis.
In support of the first hypothesis, many studies have documented that geographic
proximity is an important component of monitoring activities. For example, geographic
proximity determines the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms within bank holding
companies (Berger and DeYoung (2001, 2002)), and the representation of venture capitalists
on the boards of U.S. private firms (Lerner (1995)). Physical closeness to the firm further
influences activities of equity analyst and auditors. Malloy (2005) shows that equity analysts
forecast local stocks more accurately and that their forecast revisions for the local stock have
a strong effect on the market, suggesting that local equity analysts have information
advantage over distant analysts. Moreover, Malloy (2005) documents that the underwriter
affiliated analyst biases are only observed for the distant affiliated analysts. Choi et al.
(2007) find that local auditors provide higher quality auditing services while charging lower
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auditing fees. Like in the case of external monitors, such as banks, auditors and analysts, the
director locality or geographic proximity to the firm is more likely to be associated with an
information advantage that could lead to a more effective board. Local directors may, for
example observe more firm operations, be aware of more news about the firm in the local
media, have first-hand knowledge about the firm from their local sources, or have a better
understanding of the local industry conditions.
On the other hand, local directors may be weak monitors. Proximity to the firms is
more likely to be associated with more personal ties with the firm managers. This is because
both CEO and directors are, for example, likely to serve on other local boards, charitable
institutions and to attend the same country clubs. These interactions may lead to the
development of social and/or personal bonds between the directors and CEOs and may
compromise local directors’ objectivity.
Consequently, one can argue that the presence of local independent directors on the
board could make the board either more effective or more entrenched. The information
advantage, if available, would allow the local independent directors to monitor more
effectively, and thus lead to better firm performance. On the other side of the coin, more
frequent social interactions with the CEO may impair the independence of local directors.
This, in turn, may lead to a misalignment of directors’ and shareholders’ interest.
It is reasonable for local independent directors to be more concerned about local
issues and persons with whom they interact more frequently. Additionally, CEOs are more
visible in the local community and, consequently, local independent directors are also more
likely to weigh the implications of board decisions on their social standing. Social
considerations of local independent directors may lead to a conflict of interests with
shareholders. Local independent directors are therefore more likely to place emphasis on
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“politeness and candor at the expense of frankness and truth” (Jensen (1993)) in the
functions as members of the board. Therefore, the presence of local independent directors
could lead to a weaker board and poor firm performance.
Given the two opposite hypothesized relationships between local independent
directors and firm performance, there are several natural empirical questions that can be
addressed: are local independent directors more informed than other directors? Do firms that
have more local independent directors perform better or worse than firms that have more
geographically distant independent directors? Does the geographic dispersion of the
independent directors affect board decision-making, such as setting up CEO compensation?
In this study, I find addresses of directors for S&P 1500 firms for the years 1996 to
2004 and compute the distance between the home address and corporate headquarters for
each director. The director is identified as local if they live within a 50 miles radius from
corporate headquarters. First, I use the performance of directors’ trades in the stock of the
firm on whose board they serve as a proxy of potential information advantage. I collect all
the director trades from Thomas Financial Insider Trading Database and compute the return
for each director trade by mimicking their positions. Among all trades, I only investigate
purchase trades as they are more informative compared with sales trades (Lakonishok and
Lee (2001)). By comparing the profits from the trades of local directors and non-local
directors, I reveal that the local directors trades overall outperform the non-local directors
trades. Specifically, over a one-year horizon, the local independent directors’ trades have an
average cumulative return of 25.3% versus 21.3% for the non-local directors. After adjusting
by the value-weighted market index, the difference between the local directors’ trades and
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non-local director trades is about 3.8%1.
I further explore the issue by sorting the trades by firm characteristics. If the local
directors have an information advantage over their distant counterparts, it is reasonable to
expect that the advantage will be stronger for firms with high levels of information
asymmetry. Indeed, I find the difference on the trades by local and non-local independent
directors is strongest for the smallest size tercile or the group of firms that have the fewest
analysts following. Local directors of firms belonging to the smallest tercile earn a 7.72%
higher cumulative market adjusted return over a one-year horizon compared to the non-local
counterparts. However the return difference drops to 1.56% in large size tercile and becomes
statistically insignificant at the 5% level.
Next, I investigate whether the majority of local independent directors on the board
enhance board effectiveness, i.e. leads to better firm performance. The analysis shows an
inverse relationship between the proportion of local independent directors and firm value and
ROA, respectively. This suggests that the presence of local independent directors has a
negative impact on board effectiveness and lends support to the idea that local directors are
less effective monitors and more likely to side with the CEOs.
Finally, I investigate whether the proportion of local independent directors affect the
pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation and the total compensation CEO
received. I find that CEOs of firms with 100% non-local independent directors receive a
lower total compensation than the median number in industry.
This paper contributes to the literature in at least three research areas: (1) To the best
of my knowledge, this is the first paper that links directors’ geographic proximity to the firm

1

It is possible that this reflects only the advantage of being local investors, rather than being more informed
local directors with access to the CEOs.
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(i.e. the CEOs), and their monitoring role. Previous literature has focused on various board
characteristics and firm performance, but has failed to identify director locality as a factor
that affects board effectiveness. (2) This study sheds light on the tradeoff between having
more geographically proximate and more potentially informed independent directors and
having directors that are less informed but more objective due to their distance. Recognizing
that even unaffiliated, but geographically proximate, directors may not exercise sufficient
independence has important implications for both corporate and the mutual fund boards in
light of recent legal proposals that have sought to make boards more independent2. The
classification of directors as independent based on affiliation alone has been previously
criticized. This study provides novel evidence that independent, i.e. local but unaffiliated,
directors’ behavior is not always in line with the best interest of the shareholders. The
evidence suggests that adding geographic proximity to the CEO to the selection criteria for
director may improve shareholder values. (3) This study also contributes to the growing
literature on the importance of geography on economics by demonstrating that local
independent director trades are more profitable than those of their non-local counterparts.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Hypotheses are developed in
section I. Section II contains the data selection process and descriptive statistics. Section III
provides the results. Section IV presents additional robustness tests and section V concludes.

2

For example, in 2002 NYSE and NASD have a rule change to require that a majority of a listed firm’s
board be made up of “independent directors”. Detail of this rule can be found at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm.
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Geography and Director Independence: Background
Distance and Information
Previous research has documented that geographical proximity is of importance for
investors. The literature has shown that local investors earn, on average, higher returns
compared to remote investors. For instance, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) examine the
returns of a large number of individual investors using data from 1991 to 1996 obtained from
a discount broker and find that households exhibit a strong preference for local investments.
The average household earns an additional annualized return of 3.2% from its local holdings
relative to its non-local holdings, suggesting that local investors can exploit local knowledge.
Excess returns to investing locally are even larger, about 6%, among stocks not in the S&P
500 index.
Mutual funds also earn a higher return on holding local stocks than remote stocks.
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) separate mutual fund holdings into local and distant stocks.
Local stocks that are held by the mutual funds earn a higher return than the local stocks that
are not held by mutual funds. Moreover, turnover of the local stocks is less frequent than that
of non-local stocks. Local firms held by mutual funds tend to be small and highly leveraged.
Coval and Moskwitz (2001) suggest that stocks of firms with these kinds of characteristics
are the ones in which local investors have a greater information advantage. Further evidence
of the local information advantage comes from equity analyst and investment bank studies.
For example, Malloy (2005) finds that local analysts provide more accurate earnings forecast
and that their forecast revisions have a greater impact on the market. Butler(2007) shows that
local investment banks have better access to “soft” information and have absolute and
comparative advantage to place low-rated bonds. By employing a large sample of municipal
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bond offerings from 1997 to 2001, he finds that for per credit rating notch of the bond, the
increase in all-in cost (yield plus investment banking fee) is approximately 4.4 basis points if
the bond is underwritten by local investment banks compared with 18.7 basis points if
underwritten by non-local investment banks.
In the same vein, local directors might have their own information advantage over
directors who are residing far away from the corporate headquarters. If the local directors
possess better information, I could expect that, on average, their trades will yield higher
positive abnormal returns than that of their remote counterparts. Furthermore, it would also
be reasonable to expect that the local information advantage would decrease with firm
transparency. Large firms with greater analysts following and /or firms in the urban area
would be less likely to exhibit local information advantages. Based on the above, I propose
the following hypothesis on the information advantage associated with local directors.
H1: Local directors have an information advantage over non-local directors and the
advantage is stronger in firms with higher information asymmetry.

Distance and Monitoring
Naturally, the next question to ask is how geographic proximity of independent
directors may affect firm value. Many other studies have documented other attributes of the
board that are related to firm value. For instance, Yermack (1996) finds that the size of the
board is negatively related to firm value. Vafeas(1999) finds that board meeting frequency is
negatively related to Tobin’s Q. Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) find there is a
positive link between firm performance and the number of board seats a director holds while
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) show that firms with busy boards, i.e. those in with a majority of
outside directors holding three or more directorships, are associated with weak corporate
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governance, exhibiting lower market-to-book ratios and weaker profitability. Over a wide
range of issues, all management has to do to capture the board is to present information in a
way that is likely to generate support for its perspectives, or in a selective way, to achieve
effective capture of the board. In a model developed by Adams and Ferreira (2007), the CEO
is less likely to share information with directors when the board is monitoring intensively. If
the managers want to act against the shareholders’ interest, they can simply keep the
directors in the dark. Geographic proximity enables the local directors to have more
information advantage over the remote directors. In this sense, the board could become more
effective if the majority of outside directors are local. Therefore, I want to examine the
interplay between the effectiveness of the board and local directors.
In contrast, local independent directors are more likely to have greater levels of social
interaction with the managers. This friendly interaction makes local directors less likely to
challenge managers. Landier, Nair and Wulf (2006) have shown that the proximity to
headquarter affects the managerial concerns to their employees at different divisions. By
using a firm division level data, they show that divisions that are closer to firm headquarter
are less likely to experience layoffs. Thus, under this alternative view, geographic proximity
could cause local independent directors to work less effectively in the board.
Based on the above, the second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: Geographic proximity does not affect firm value, other things equal. The firm
that has a greater proportion of local independent directors is not systematically different
from the firms that have few local independent directors.

Director Locality and CEO Compensation
The board of directors is the primary internal corporate governance mechanism
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responsible for setting management compensation and monitoring senior management
(Jensen (1993)). It has been considered to play an important role in setting an effective
incentive contract structure that alleviates agency problems arising from the separation of
ownership and control (Murpey(1999), Cory, Guay and Larker(2001)). If boards with more
local independent directors act more effectively because locals are better informed, then
companies with such boards will favor lower non-incentive pay (such as cash compensation)
and higher pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. However, the opposite effect
may hold if the proximity of the directors’ residence compromises their objectivity. In that
case, the local independent directors may be less likely to challenge the CEO in
compensation matter in the board. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis.
H3: The director geographic proximity does not systematically affect CEO
compensation and there is no systematic difference in CEO total compensation and CEO
incentive compensation and performance between firms with board dominated by local
directors and other things being equal.

Data and Variable Constructions
Sample Selection
The databases used in this study are CRSP, Compustat, IRRC, ExecuComp, I/B/E/S,
and Insider Trading. The IRRC database covers board director information for S&P 1500
firms for the period 1996-2004. For each director in the database, I identify her home address
from her report on their insider trading to the SEC. For the directors who change their home
address at a given year, I pick the address that is closer to the annual board meeting date. The
stock return of the firm is retrieved from CRSP database while the accounting information is
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from Compustat database.

Variables
Distance is defined as the number of miles from the director’s home address to
corporate headquarters. I computed it based on the zip codes of these two addresses. I then
classify a director as local if the distance between the director’s home address and corporate
headquarters is within 50 miles and non-local if the distance is greater than 50 miles. To
obtain a clearer local variable, I exclude director observations where the distance is between
50 and 100 miles for the tests of directors’ trades3.
I identify around 11,300 distinct zip codes in the data. I obtain the latitude and
longitude for each of the zip codes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer Place and Zip
Code Database. The corresponding company location comes from Compact Disclosure,
which contain information about the company headquarters’ zip code. Finally, I compute the
distances based on the combination of firm headquarters’ zip code and directors zip code4.
Table 1 presents the distributions of directors by distance from their firms’
headquarters. For the employee directors, 18,560 out of 22,879 director-year observations
are within 50 miles. This is not surprising since most of employee directors are working in
the corporate headquarters. For the employee directors, only 3,966 out of 22,879 directoryear observations live over 100 miles away, accounting for about 17% of all insider directoryear observations. For the independent directors, there are 33,724 out of 68,751 outside
director-year observations are within 50 miles radius, accounting for 49% of all observations
for independent directors. Over 48% or 32,751 of independent director year observations are

3

There are 696 buy trade observations from the directors who live between 50 and 100 miles away from
headquarters.
4
A detailed explanation about the method can be found in Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005).
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over 100 miles away from the corporate headquarters. Looking at the geographic distribution
by the city or state, there are 3,214 employee directors living in the same city as the
headquarters and 18,764 living in the same state. This is compared with 3,908 independent
directors who live in the same city and 36,075 who live in the same state as the corporate
headquarters.
In this study, my main variable for geographic proximity is the local variable
classified by the distance. The drawback of the same-state or same-city variable is that
headquarter and director home addresses might be located close to state boundaries or city
boundaries leading to incorrect classification of proximity. Since my focus is on the social
interaction between independent directors and CEOs, the distance measure would better
capture the proximity between the CEO and directors. For example, the independent director
who lives in Miami would not necessary have more social interaction with the CEO in
Jacksonville than the independent directors living in Savannah, Georgia.

Table 1 Distribution of Director by Distance
Director Type

Distance

SameCity

SameState

Total

< 50 miles

50-100 miles

> 100 miles

Employee

18,560

353

3,966

3,214

18,764

22,879

Independent

33,724

2,456

32,571

3,908

36,075

68,751

Gray

9,440

506

6,293

1,439

9,872

16,239

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the major variables. Q is defined as
market value of the firm divided by the replacement cost, as in Chung and Pruitt (1994)5. It

5

Alternatively, Q has been proxied by the mmarket-to-book ratio, as the market value of the firm’s equity at
the end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm's assets and the book value of the
firm's equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm's assets at the end of the year. In
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is computed as the sum of market value of equity, liquidation value of preferred
stock(Compustat item 10), net value of debt, which is short term debt liability (Compustat
item 72 ) net current asset (Compustat item 68), and book value of long term debt
(Compustat item 9), and then scaled by book value of total assets. In the sample, firms have
a mean Q of 1.43 with a standard deviation of 1.84.
ROA is computed, following Fich and Shivdasani (2006), as operating income before
depreciation (Compustat item 13) plus the decrease in receivables (Compustat item 2), the
decrease in inventory (Compustat item 3), the increase in current liabilities (Compustat item
72), and the decrease in other current assets (Compustat item 68). I then scared it by the
average of beginning- and ending-year book value of total assets (Compustat item 6).
Following Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), I also create a variable for CEO
involvement to measure the influence of CEO in the selection of directors. It equals to 1
when the CEO sits on the nominating committee or CEO sits on the board when the firm
does not have a nominating committee. It has a mean value of 0.3, indicating that in about
30% of the firm whose director selection procedure is influenced by the CEOs.
I also use urban and rural variables as documented in Loughran and Schultz (2005).
A stock is defined as an urban stock if the company headquarters is in one of the ten largest
metropolitan areas of the United States according to the 2000 census. These include New
York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington-Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia,
Boston, Detroit, Dallas, and Houston. A company is defined as rural if its headquarters is
100 miles or more from the center of any of the 49 U.S. metropolitan areas of one million or
more people according to the 2000 census. The sample has 40% director-year observations
with headquarter in urban areas, 8% in rural area and the remaining 52% in the suburbs.
the tests, using this metric, not reported for the sake of brevity, yield similar results with the ones reported
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I created two variables to identify the independent director’s geographic
characteristics based on the distance of their residence from firm headquarters: a) an
indicator variable for 100% non-local independent directors on the board, and b) the number
of local independent directors on the board. In the sample, about 16% of the available firmyear observations have a board with 100% non-local independent directors. The sample
firms have an average 2.79 local independent directors with a median 2 local independent
directors on the board. Overall, 50% of independent directors on the board are local.
In Panels B and C of Table 2, I also separate the sample firms into groups based on
the geographic characteristics: urban and rural, and based on the board locality
characterisitics: zero local independent directors’ board and all others. As shown in Panel B,
urban firms are, on average, larger than rural firms. Urban firms also have more local
independent directors on the board. On average, urban firms have 2.9 local independent
directors (55% of the total independent directors) compared with 2.2 for the rural firms (39%
of the total independent directors).
In Panels B and C of Table 2, I also separate the sample firms into groups based on
the geographic characteristics: urban and rural, and based on the board locality
characterisitics: zero local independent directors’ board and all others. As shown in Panel B,
urban firms are, on average, larger than rural firms. Urban firms also have more local
independent directors on the board. On average, urban firms have 2.9 local independent
directors (55% of the total independent directors) compared with 2.2 for the rural firms (39%
of the total independent directors).
When we compare the firms with 100% non-local independent director boards with
all other firms, we observe that the former group, on average, consists of small firms in terms

here.
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of assets value. Also, in contrast to firms with local independent directors on the board, those
firms are more likely to be headquartered in a rural area, rather than in an urban area. For the
firms with zero local independent directors 28% are in urban and 15% are in rural areas,
while 42% (7%) of firms with all other types of board structure are in (rural) areas.
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A
Firm characteristics
Mean
Median
Sales ($ million)
4527
1218
Assets ($ million)
11711
1568
Q
1.43
0.98
Return on assets
0.13
0.13
Age
27.55
22
# of business segments
2.7
2
Capital expenditure/assets
0.06
0.04
Governance structure and CEO compensation
Mean
Median
Board size
8.74
8
Number of independent directors
6.17
6
CEO ownership (%)
2.54
0.33
Director ownership (%)
8.62
1.3
CEO compensation ($ million)
11.83
6.59
CEO involvement dummy
0.3
0
CEO-Chair dummy
0.66
1
Board and firm geographic characteristics
Mean
Median
Urban dummy
0.4
0
Rural dummy
0.08
0
100% non-local independent director board
0.16
0
# of local independent directors
2.79
2
% of independent directors are local
50%
50%
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SD
12491
55096
1.84
0.12
18.73
1.79
0.06

N
11416
11416
11416
10483
11416
10691
10569

SD
2.97
2.72
6.22
19.51
18.67
0.46
0.47

N
11416
11416
9978
11416
10439
11416
11416

SD
0.49
0.27
0.36
2.29
33%

N
11416
11416
11416
11416
11416

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (continue)
Panel B
Firm Characteristics
Urban Firms

Sales ($ million)
Assets ($ million)
Q
Return on assets
Age
# of business segments
Capital expenditure/assets
Board size
Number of independent
directors
CEO ownership (%)
Director ownership (%)
CEO compensation ($
million)
CEO involvement dummy
CEO-Chair dummy
100% non-local
independent director board
# of local independent
directors
% of independent directors
are local

Mean
5416.97
17993.14
1.55
0.17
27.49
2.8
0.06
8.59

Rural Firms

Median
SD
N
Mean
Median
1271.65
15316.8
4570
4771.82
979.69
1889.06 76853.02 4570
7234.28
1459.01
1
2.37
4570
1.09
0.88
0.16
0.18
4082
0.17
0.16
21
20.14
4570
28.34
28
3
1.84
4284
3.2
3
0.04
0.06
4224
0.07
0.05
Governance structure and CEO compensation
8
2.96
4570
8.97
9
2.56
5.79
18.02

4570
3919
4570

6.35
3.42
7.62

6
0.41
1.4

SD
18568.02
15680.82
0.9
0.17
16.21
2.04
0.07

N
930
930
930
828
930
848
849

Difference
of Mean
645.15
10758.86
0.46
0
-0.85
-0.4
-0.01

Pvalue
0.26
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.27
0.00
0.00

2.96

930

-0.38

0.00

2.71
8.34
14.74

930
816
930

-0.35
-0.94
0.94

0.00
0.00
0.13

8148.3
0.47
0.49

856
930
930

7533.54
-0.03
0.05

0.00
0.03
0.00

6
2.48
8.56

6
0.31
1.3

14824.2
0.29
0.67

8236.72
0
1

0.11

0

0.31

4570

0.29

0

0.45

930

-0.18

0.00

2.98

3

2.19

4570

2.23

2

2.26

930

0.75

0.00

0.55

0.6

0.32

4570

0.39

0.33

0.36

930

0.16

0.00

21989.99 4159
7290.66
4494.46
0.45
4570
0.32
0
0.47
4570
0.62
1
Board geographic characteristics
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (continue)
Panel C
Firm Characteristics
Board w/ 100% non-Local Directors
Board w/ Local Directors

Sales ($ million)
Assets ($ million)
Q
Return on assets
Age
# of business segments
Capital expenditure/assets
Board size
Number of independent
directors
CEO ownership (%)
Director ownership (%)
CEO compensation ($
million)
CEO involvement dummy
CEO-Chair dummy
Urban dummy
Rural dummy

Mean
4511.17
6784.46
1.43
0.17
26.33
2.67
0.07

Median
1040.21
1300.03
1.01
0.17
19
2
0.05

7.89

8

5.27
2.69
10.52

5
0.39
1.7

10483.37
0.34
0.64

6258.78
0
1

0.28
0.15

0
0

SD
N
Mean
Median
13896.85 1779
4533.15
1259.6
35458.51 1779
12634.13
1646.31
2.28
1779
1.43
0.97
0.18
1707
0.17
0.17
19.32
1779
27.78
23
1.82
1757
2.71
3
0.07
1742
0.06
0.04
Governance structure and CEO compensation
2.79
1779
8.91
9
2.61
6.46
23.67

1779
1491
1779

6.34
2.52
8.28

6
0.32
1.3

16344.29 1560
12079.53
6670.28
0.47
1779
0.3
0
0.48
1779
0.67
1
Firm Geographic Characteristics
0.45
1779
0.42
0
0.36
1779
0.07
0
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SD
12223.13
57995.98
1.75
0.17
18.62
1.78
0.06

N
9623
9623
9623
8666
9623
8920
8814

Difference
of mean
-21.98
-5849.67
0
0
-1.45
-0.04
0.01

2.97

9623

-1.02

2.7
6.18
18.63

9623
8473
9623

-1.07
0.17
2.24

19051.08
0.46
0.47

8865
9623
9623

-1596.16
0.04
-0.03

0.00
0.00

0.49
0.25

9623
9623

-0.14
0.08

0.00
0.00

P-value
0.94
0.00
0.93
0.23
0.00
0.39
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.34
0.00
0.00

Empirical Results
Directors Trades Return: Local vs. Non-local
In order to test the information advantage of the local directors versus non-local
directors, I collect all insider buys for all independent directors from Insider Trading
database6. For each director-purchase trade, I mimic it by going long the firm’s stock and at
same time short the value-weighted CRSP market index. I compute cumulative market
adjusted returns and buy and hold market adjust return for each trade. The cumulative market
adjusted return for the horizon H is computed as the sum of difference of daily stock return
and daily value-weighted market index return.
H

H

t =1

t =1

CARiH = ∑ Rit − ∑ RIndex , H
The buy and hold market adjusted return (BHAR) for the horizon H is the sum of
compounded daily stock return minus the compounded daily value weighted CRSP market
index return.

BHARiH = (1 + Ri1 ) × (1 + Ri 2 ) ⋅⋅(1 + RiH ) − (1 + RIndex1 ) × (1 + RIndex 2 ) ⋅⋅(1 + RIndexH )
Each director-purchase trade is then classified into local or non-local trades based on
the geographic location of the directors. Table 3 presents the directors trades cumulative
return and BHR return before and after adjusted by the value weighted CRSP index for
periods from 3 months up to 2 years.
As shown in the Table 3, the cumulative return for the local independent directors’
purchase trades ranges between 0.085 for a three months period to 0.44 for two years,
compared with 0.078 to 0.375 for non-local independent directors trades. The difference
between their trades stands 0.008 to 0.065, which are statically significant at the 5% level.
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After adjusting by the CRSP value-weighted market return, the difference of the trades’
profit are similar to those of cumulative returns and are still significant, in both economic
and statistic levels.
Panel C and D show the buy and hold return for the director trades. For all periods
from 3 months to 2 years, the return for local independent director purchase trades are higher
than non-local director trades. The differences between these two are still statistically
significant.

Table 3 Trading Performance of Directors: Local vs. Non-local
Panel A: Cumulative return
Local independent
Non-local independent
Difference(Local-Non-local)
P-values

3 months
0.085
0.078
0.008
(0.038)

6 months
0.140
0.110
0.030
(0.000)

1 year
0.253
0.213
0.040
(0.000)

2 years
0.440
0.375
0.065
(0.000)

Panel B: Market adjusted cumulative return
Local independent
Non-local independent
Difference(Local-Non-local)
P-values

0.053
0.045
0.007
(0.038)

0.080
0.053
0.027
(0.000)

0.142
0.104
0.038
(0.000)

0.268
0.193
0.074
(0.000)

Panel C: Buy and hold return
Local independent
Non-local independent
Difference(Local-Non-local)
P-values

0.082
0.072
0.009
(0.026)

0.137
0.104
0.034
(0.000)

0.302
0.209
0.092
(0.000)

0.495
0.400
0.095
(0.000)

Panel D: Market adjusted buy and hold return
Local independent
Non-local independent
Difference(Local-Non-local)
P-values

0.049
0.041
0.009
(0.026)

0.078
0.048
0.030
(0.000)

0.188
0.097
0.091
(0.000)

0.305
0.198
0.107
(0.000)

In Table 4, I sort the firms in the sample into the size terciles and report CARs and
BHARs by size terciles. Malloy (2005) shows that the local information advantage is
stronger in small and highly levered firms. If local directors, as other monitors, also have an
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information advantage, the advantage would be stronger when the firm has less external
information which the non-local directors could use. On the other hand, the local information
advantage can be diminished if the firms are larger or more transparent. To account for this,
each firm is assigned into small, middle and top size tercile based on the market value at the
end of previous calendar year.
As shown in the Table 4, the difference between the returns for local directors’ trades
and non-local director trades appears to be strongest in the small tercile and gradually
declines for the medium and large size terciles. For example, the difference for the 6 month
period is 4.3% between the local director trades and non-local director trades in small size
tercile, while for the top size tercile, the difference is only 1.99%. Moreover, it becomes
insignificant for the 1 year and 2 year horizon for the firms in top size tercile. This result
indicates in small firms local directors have a clearer information advantage while for the
large firms; the local information advantage becomes weaker as the large firms have more
external information availability. This finding could be driven by the fact that analysts are
more likely to follow the large firms, large firms have greater media coverage and more
voluntary disclosures. This is consistent with Malloy (2005)’s finding.

Table 4 Trading Performance of Directors by Distance
and Firm’s Information Characteristics

Local Independent
Non-local independent
Difference(Local-Nonlocal)
P-values

Market-Adjusted Return by Size Tercile
Small Size Tercile
Cumulative Return
Buy and Hold Return
6 month
1 year
2 years
6 month
1 year
2 years
16.65%
28.57%
49.07%
18.21%
41.64%
68.61%
12.35%
20.85%
30.30%
13.11%
22.14%
40.96%
4.30%
(0.00)

7.72%
(0.00)
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18.77%
(0.00)

5.10%
(0.00)

19.50%
(0.00)

27.65%
(0.00)

Table 4 Trading Performance of Directors by Distance
and Firm’s Information Characteristics (continue)

Local Independent
Non-local independent
Difference(Local-Nonlocal)
P-values
Local Independent
Non-local independent
Difference(Local-Nonlocal)
P-values

6.02%
4.02%

11.63%
8.71%

2.00%
(0.02)

2.92%
(0.03)

3.25%
1.26%
1.99%
(0.00)

Middle Size Tercile
23.99%
5.42%
20.29%
2.97%

14.76%
7.44%

21.92%
17.35%

7.32%
(0.00)

4.57%
(0.08)

5.74%
4.18%

3.70%
2.45%
(0.04)
(0.01)
Top Size Tercile
12.48%
2.18%
10.68%
0.22%

5.19%
2.36%

9.71%
6.50%

1.56%
(0.10)

1.80%
(0.15)

2.83%
(0.01)

3.21%
(0.05)

1.96%
(0.00)

Multivariate Regression Tests: Director Locality and Trades Return
Though the univariate tests show that there is a significant difference between local
versus non-local director trades, these tests do not control for other effects that could explain
the trading differences between local and non-local directors. Table 5 presents the
multivariate regression tests for the following models:

BHARiH = Localdummyi , j ,t + DirectorHoldingi , j ,t + ε
BHARiH = Localdummyi , j ,t + DirectorHoldingi , j ,t + Sizei ,t + BM i ,t + ε
BHARiH = Localdummyi , j ,t + DirectorHoldingi , j ,t + Sizei ,t + BM i ,t + PoorGovernancei ,t + ε
where DirectorHolding i,j,t is the percentage of the shares held by each director j in
firm i at time t . Localdummyi,j,t equals to 1 if director j’s home address is within 50 miles
from firm i’s corporate headquarters or 0 otherwise. Size is the market value of the firm at
the end of the previous calendar year; book to market is defined as the book value at fiscal
year scaled by the market value of the firm; PoorGovernance is equal to 1 if the G-index is
greater than 10 and 0 otherwise. As shown in Table V, the dependent variables are the
compounding abnormal market return at the different horizons. The independent variables
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are local director indicator (0,1) and director holding. The local director indicator, which is
the variable of main concern, is statistically significant at the 1% level or better for the six
months- and one year horizons. The result indicates that on average the local director trades
yield 0.01 or 1% more than non-local director trades for the three months- and the difference
goes up to 0.03 for the six months horizon.
In the second model, I include size and book-to-market as additional controls in the
main regressions. Size and book-to-market have been documented as main explanatory
variables for cross-sectional returns. Adding these two variables does not alter the effect of
the local director indicator. The coefficients for the local director indicators remain pretty
stable in all three regressions in the second model. Size has a negative coefficient, indicating
that director trades have a lower return when the size goes up.
In the third model, I control for the quality of the firm’s governance by adding a poor
governance dummy. The evidence shows that if firms have poor governance (i.e., a G-Index
of 10 or more), their directors’ trades yield a higher return. Directors earn 2.6% higher return
on their trades over a one year horizon if the firm has poor governance. This evidence
implies that in poor governance firms, insiders are more likely to enjoy an informational
advantage.
The results in Table 3 to 5 show that the local directors’ trades yield a higher
abnormal return than those of the non-local directors. However, this evidence cannot answer
the question of where this return difference comes from and how other governance
mechanisms, such as analysts, board meetings and board memberships, could alleviate this
advantage. In Table 6, I add the following variables to the model: number of analysts
following the stock at the quarter when the trade made; audit committee member dummy;
less than 75% board meeting dummy, which equals to one if the director attends over 75% of
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the board meetings; interaction terms with the local director variables.
If board attendance or audit committee membership is substitute channels for
accessing firm’s information, then they could also explain the performance of director trades.
As shown in all regressions, the significance of local director trades is not affected after
adding these two controls: an indicator of board attendance which equals to 1 if the director
attends less than 75% board meetings and a dummy for audit committee membership, and it
is still significant statistically at 0.000 level.
Board attendance has a negative coefficient, implying that attending less board
meeting would reduce the trade profit. Audit membership also has a positive coefficient but
insignificant for the horizons over six months and one year, indicating being a member of the
audit committee will result in more profitable trades.
The inclusion of interaction terms serves the purpose of disentangling the effects of
the “informative monitor” and “social ally” roles the local directors may play on the board.
Conditional on analyst following or size, the marginal effect of the local indicator variable
would be smaller if local directors play an “informative monitor” role.
However, conditional on the poor governance, I would expect the marginal effect of
the local director indicator would be greater if local directors assume the role of the CEO’s
“social ally”. Note that, as shown in Table 5, if the firm has poor governance, both local and
distant directors would expect to have earn higher returns on their trades, consistent with the
notion that they both enjoy some information advantage.
As shown in Table 6, the coefficients for the interaction terms between the local
director indicator and analyst following and poor governance respectively, are significant
and negative when performance is measured over a one year horizon.
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Table 5 Independent directors’ trades return: local vs. non-local

Local director
indicator (0,1)
Director holding

3-month

6-month

1-year

0.011
(0.013)**
-0.001
(0.301)

0.033
(0.000)***
-0.000
(0.721)

0.103
(0.000)***
0.001
(0.571)

Size
Book to market

Buy and Hold Market Adjusted Return
3-month
6-month
1-year
0.011
(0.012)**
-0.001
(0.447)
-0.000
(0.000)***
0.024
(0.003)***

0.034
(0.000)***
-0.000
(0.999)
-0.001
(0.000)***
0.046
(0.005)***

3-month

6-month

1-year

0.103
(0.000)***
0.002
(0.308)
-0.001
(0.000)***
0.094
(0.011)**

0.011
(0.011)**
-0.001
(0.519)
-0.000
(0.000)***
0.025
(0.003)***

0.034
(0.000)***
0.000
(0.959)
-0.001
(0.000)***
0.047
(0.005)***

0.103
(0.000)***
0.002
(0.270)
-0.001
(0.000)***
0.096
(0.011)**

-0.128
(0.000)***
16038
0.03

0.018
(0.000)***
-0.030
(0.023)**
16038
0.04

0.013
(0.073)*
-0.013
(0.549)
16038
0.05

0.026
(0.089)*
-0.135
(0.000)***
16038
0.03

Poor governance(Gindex>10)
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

-0.013
(0.293)
16038
0.03

0.016
(0.388)
16038
0.04

-0.078
(0.004)***
16038
0.03

-0.026
(0.050)*
16038
0.04

-0.010
(0.652)
16038
0.05

This suggests that the informational advantage of the local directors over the distant directors decreases as analyst
following increases. This is consistent with the notion that the local directors’ information advantage weakens in the more
transparent firms. The coefficient of the interaction term between local director indicator and audit committee membership indicator
is positive, indicating that local directors enjoy and even greater information advantage if they are also sitting on the audit
committee.
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The negative coefficient of the interaction term between local director indicator and
poor governance implies that the local directors’ information advantage relative to distant
directors becomes smaller when governance is poor.

Table 6 Independent directors’ trades return: local versus non-local
after controlling for asymmetry information

Local director
Size
Book to market
Director holding
Number of analysts
Less than 75% attendance indicator (0,1)
Committee membership - audit
Poor governance(G-Index >10)
Local X Size
Local X Analysts
Local X Audit Membership
Local X Poor governance
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Buy and Hold Market Adjusted Return
3-month
6-month
1-year
0.004
0.061
0.137
(0.700)
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
-0.000
-0.000
-0.001
(0.003)***
(0.110)
(0.000)***
0.034
0.062
0.130
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.001)***
-0.004
-0.004
-0.002
(0.000)***
(0.034)**
(0.468)
-0.001
-0.002
-0.001
(0.038)**
(0.003)***
(0.487)
-0.004
-0.033
-0.038
(0.771)
(0.111)
(0.306)
-0.008
0.011
0.005
(0.269)
(0.303)
(0.771)
0.026
0.061
0.086
(0.001)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
0.000
-0.000
0.000
(0.035)**
(0.884)
(0.669)
-0.000
-0.000
-0.006
(0.595)
(0.861)
(0.013)**
0.014
0.010
0.116
(0.174)
(0.522)
(0.000)***
-0.004
-0.073
-0.083
(0.675)
(0.000)***
(0.008)***
-0.024
-0.021
-0.184
(0.100)*
(0.371)
(0.000)***
13542
13542
13542
0.04
0.05
0.04

Firm Value and Director Locality
Previous research has documented that firm value is related to the board
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characteristics. An effective board would likely enhance the firm value. For example,
Yermack (1996) finds a negative link between board size and firm value, Fich and
Shivdasani (2006) shows that busy boards have a negative impact on firm’s Q. Vafeas
(1999) presents evidence that board meetings become more frequent after bad firm
performance. However, how the distribution of director affects board effectiveness and
hence the firm value is not yet resolved. In the previous section, I have shown that local
independent directors seem to have more information on their firms, as evidenced by their
more informative trades. According to our efficiency hypothesis, more local independent
directors sitting on the board would benefit the firm by increasing efficiency and, hence,
improve the Q as the local directors are more informed and thus better monitors. On the
other hand, the likelihood of social interaction between board independent directors and
corporate executives increases with geographic proximity and, thus, creates a weaker board
when the board is dominated by the local directors.
To address this issue, I collect data from 1996 to 2004 from IRRC and find the
distance information for each director in the board. The number of firms per year with nonmissing distance information ranges about 800 to 1100 firms per year. The dependent
variable Q is defined following Chung and Pruitt (1994). The main explanatory variable is
director locality. I create two different director locality variables. The first one is the number
of local independent directors on the board, and the second one is the zero local independent
directors’ indicator, which takes the value of 1 if there is none of the independent directors
who are local, and 0 otherwise. To control the board characteristics, I include several main
variables previously used in the literature. The independent variables include the log form of
board size (Yermack(1996)), stock ownership of CEOs, directors’ ownership(Morck,
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Shleifer and Vishny(1988)), busy board dummy, which is equal to 1 if the firm has at least 1
busy director(Fich and Shivdasai(2006)), log form of number of board meetings
(Vafeas(1999), firm age, number of different business segments(Lang and Stultz(1994)),
growth opportunity as proxied by capital expenditure (Smith and Watts(1992)), firm
leverage and size proxied by the log form of sales.
Table 7 shows the result for the fixed-effect panel regressions. The year dummies are
also included but not reported. In the first column of Table 7, the locality variable is the
number of local independent directors. The coefficient for the number of local independent
directors is negative and significant. This shows that for each additional local independent
director on the board, the Q on average decreases by 0.045.
The board size has a negative and slightly significant coefficient in the first
regression. This is consistent with Yermack (1996) and indicates a large board would be less
effective and thus decrease the firms’ value. CEO ownership and director ownership both
have a positive impact on Q but only CEO ownership has a statically significant effect. This
result is consistent with the notion that ownership helps align the interests of the CEO and
stockholders. Busy board has a negative coefficient, in support of the view that the directors
who are busy would exert less effort. Consistent with Vafeas(1999), the number of board
meetings is associated with lower Qs, possibly because firms tend to increase the frequency
of board meetings after they have experienced poor performance.
In the second column, I create a strong local board dummy to explore the effect of
non-local independent directors on the board. The base group is that the firm with at least
one local independent directors. As shown in the table 7, the zero local independent director
dummy has a significant positive impact on the firm value. Compared with base group, on
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average, the Q is 0.317 higher for the firm with zero local independent directors or 100%
non-local independent directors. Given that the standard deviation of Q is 1.84, it indicates
that firm with no local directors on the board would have about a 17% higher Q than other
firms.
The results do not support the notion that the presence of local independent directors
helps improve board effectiveness, i.e. increase the firm value. Instead the finding in Table 7
implies that firm value decreases with the presence of more local independent directors on
the board.
Q mostly reflects the firm’s market value or the value of growth opportunities. In the
next section, I discuss how accounting performance measures are affected by the board
locality.

Table 7 Fixed effect regression of Q on director locality characteristics
Q
# of local independent directors

-0.045
(0.011)**

Zero local independent directors indicator (0,1)
Log(board size)

-0.206
(0.080)*
0.021
(0.000)***
0.002
(0.258)
-0.030
(0.476)
-0.158
(0.011)**
0.001
(0.946)
-0.012
(0.454)
2.982
(0.000)***

CEO ownership
Director ownership
Busy directors on the board indicator (0,1)
Log(number of board meetings)
Age
Number of different business segments
Capital expenditure
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0.317
(0.000)***
-0.246
(0.031)**
0.020
(0.000)***
0.002
(0.229)
-0.034
(0.429)
-0.161
(0.010)***
0.002
(0.891)
-0.013
(0.430)
2.962
(0.000)***

Table 7 Fixed effect regression of Q on director locality characteristics (continue)
Leverage

-1.474
(0.000)***
-0.221
(0.000)***
4.115
(0.000)***
8972
0.03

Log(sales)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

-1.482
(0.000)***
-0.229
(0.000)***
4.065
(0.000)***
8972
0.03

The corporate governance literature has documented extensively that firm
performance and board composition are endogenous. It is possible, in the context of this
study, that firms with weak governance choose a board that is tilted toward greater local
director representation, which in turn leads to poor performance. To address this issue, we
conduct a two stage instrumental variables (IV) test to for the endogenous nature of the
relationship between performance and board geographic structure.
In the first stage of the regression, we use the number of local independent directors
or the zero local independent directors’ dummy as the dependent variables. The independent
variables are: a CEO involvement dummy, which is takes the value of one if the CEO is
sitting in the nomination committee or if the CEO is chair when the company does not have a
nomination committee, and the value of zero otherwise; an urban dummy, which takes the
value of one if the headquarters of the firm are located if the firm’s headquarter is located in
one of the ten largest metropolitan areas of the United States according to the 2000 census;
the interaction term between the CEO involvement dummy and the urban dummy; the
interaction term between the CEO involvement dummy and the natural logarithm of the
number of independent directors; and, the interaction term between the urban dummy and the
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natural logarithm of the number of independent directors. The remaining independent
variables are all control variables used to predict firm value. As shown in the table 8, the
interaction term between CEO involvement dummy and the natural logarithm of the number
of independent directors has a coefficient of 0.118, indicating that conditioning on the
number of independent directors, the board will have on average 0.118 more local directors
when the CEO is involved in the nomination. In addition, when the firm is located in an
urban area, the firm has 1.47 more local directors on the board. The same result is obtained
when the dependent variable used is the zero local independent directors dummy:
conditioning on the number of independent directors, firms when the CEO is involved in the
nomination and firm headquarted in the urban area, are less likely to have a board with zero
local independent board.
Our second stage regression uses the control variables used in our previous tests of
firm value together with the predicted board locality variable from the first stage. The results
we obtain remain qualitatively similar to the ones obtained from the OLS regressions. As
shown in Table 8, the firm value exhibit a negative association with the boards dominated by
local directors. An additional local independent director would reduce Tobin’s Q by 0.5.
Compared with a zero local independent director board, the other boards lead to 4.5 lower in
terms of Q.
Table 8 Two Stage IV regression of Q on director locality characteristics

First Stage
# of local independent directors
Zero local independent directors indicator (0,1)

Q
Second
Stage
-0.583
(0.000)***

First
Stage

Second
Stage

4.878
(0.000)***
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Table 8 Two Stage IV regression of Q on director locality characteristics
(continue)
log(board size)
CEO ownership
Director Ownership
Whether the firm has any busy directors
Log(Number of board meetings)
Firm Age
Number of different business segments that
a firm has
Capital Expenditure Adj
Book Leverage
Log(sales)
CEO involved in nomination indicator (0,1)
Urban dummy
CEO involvement X Urban
Log(# of independent directors) X CEO
involvement
Log(# of independent directors) X Urban

1.553
(0.000)
0.005
(0.201)
-0.005
(0.000)
-0.036
(0.253)
-0.031
(0.431)
-0.026
(0.025)

0.747
(0.000)***
0.020
(0.001)***
-0.001
(0.491)
0.033
(0.465)
-0.153
(0.020)**
-0.015
(0.404)

-0.108
(0.000)
0.000
(0.915)
0.000
(0.424)
0.001
(0.911)
0.014
(0.131)
0.000
(0.998)

0.318
(0.046)**
0.016
(0.019)**
-0.000
(0.983)
-0.005
(0.924)
-0.202
(0.007)***
-0.000
(0.986)

0.010
(0.387)
0.160
(0.638)
-0.113
(0.381)
-0.127
(0.001)
-0.237
(0.014)
-2.313
(0.000)
0.021
(0.682)

0.031
(0.083)*
1.940
(0.001)***
-1.567
(0.000)***
-0.094
(0.107)

-0.004
(0.142)
0.126
(0.102)
0.034
(0.253)
0.032
(0.000)
0.096
(0.000)
0.141
(0.295)
0.007
(0.521)

0.030
(0.139)
1.419
(0.031)**
-1.713
(0.000)***
-0.191
(0.003)***

0.118
(0.019)
1.478
(0.000)

Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of spc permanent number

-0.065
(0.000)
-0.083
(0.000)
3.051
(0.000)***
8972

2.068
(0.013)**
8972

1804

1804

Directors Locality and ROA
Table 9 presents multivariate regressions of ROA on director locality. The dependent
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variable, ROA, is created following Fich and Shivdasani (2006) as previously described.7
The other independent variables are those included in the Q regressions. As shown in Table
VIII, the results of the ROA regressions are consistent with those of the Q regressions. Local
director presence has a negative impact on the ROA. The coefficient of the number of local
independent director variable is -0.004, indicating that for an additional local director in the
board, the firm ROA decreases by 0.004. The impact of locality becomes stronger when I
compare the board with 100% no local directors and those with at least 1 local director in the
board, the difference is 0.029. It implies that the board with no local directors on the board
has a 0.029 higher ROA than other firms. Considering that the standard deviation of ROA is
about 0.12, the firm with zero local independent directors has a about 0.23 standard deviation
higher ROA than other counterparts.

Table 9 Fixed effect regression of ROA on director locality characteristics
# of local independent directors
Zero local independent directors indicator (0,1)
Log(board size)
CEO ownership
Director ownership
Busy directors on the board indicator (0,1)
Log(number of board meetings)
Age

7

Return on Assets
-0.004
(0.025)**
0.029
(0.000)***
-0.020
-0.024
(0.075)*
(0.034)**
0.003
0.003
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
-0.000
-0.000
(0.409)
(0.437)
-0.017
-0.017
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
-0.017
-0.017
(0.005)***
(0.005)***
-0.001
-0.001
(0.471)
(0.509)

For the sake of brevity, we also have two different definitions of ROA. But the results are basically same.
So we omitted it to report in the tables.
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Table 9 Fixed effect regression of ROA on director locality characteristics (continue)
Number of different business segments

-0.013
(0.000)***
0.509
(0.000)***
-0.121
(0.000)***
0.069
(0.000)***
-0.167
(0.009)***
8740
0.06

Capital expenditure
Leverage
Log(sales)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

-0.013
(0.000)***
0.507
(0.000)***
-0.121
(0.000)***
0.068
(0.000)***
-0.171
(0.007)***
8740
0.06

Following the IV technique in the previous section, we ran the same test tor the ROA
regression, the result remains also qualitatively similar to the fixed effect regression. On
average, a local independent director is associated with a reduction in ROA by 0.07, while a
zero local independent board would cause a 0.7 increase in ROA.

Table 10 Two Stage IV regression of ROA on director locality characteristics

First Stage
# of local independent directors

ROA
Second
Stage
First Stage
-0.078
(0.000)***

Zero local independent directors indicator (0,1)
log(board size)

1.543
(0.000)
0.005
(0.143)
-0.005
(0.000)
-0.038
(0.229)
-0.029
(0.463)

CEO ownership
Director Ownership
Whether the firm has any busy directors
Log(Number of board meetings)

33

0.109
(0.000)***
0.003
(0.000)***
-0.001
(0.002)***
-0.008
(0.094)*
-0.016
(0.018)**

-0.108
(0.000)
0.000
(0.834)
0.000
(0.310)
0.002
(0.743)
0.010
(0.264)

Second
Stage

0.702
(0.000)***
0.060
(0.001)***
0.002
(0.004)***
-0.000
(0.047)**
-0.014
(0.016)**
-0.021
(0.016)**

Table 10 Two Stage IV regression of ROA on director locality characteristics (continue)
Firm Age
Number of different bus segments that a firm
has
Capital Expenditure Adj
Book Leverage
Lsales
CEO involved in nomination indicator (0,1)
Urban dummy
CEO involvement X Urban
Log(# of independent directors) X CEO
involvement

-0.026
(0.026)

-0.003
(0.066)*

0.000
(0.996)

-0.001
(0.533)

0.008
(0.491)
0.149
(0.677)
-0.115
(0.379)
-0.126
(0.001)
-0.219
(0.025)
-2.308
(0.000)
0.023
(0.657)

-0.007
(0.000)***
0.351
(0.000)***
-0.133
(0.000)***
0.086
(0.000)***

-0.004
(0.092)
0.156
(0.054)
0.024
(0.417)
0.032
(0.000)
0.102
(0.000)
0.128
(0.344)
0.006
(0.624)

-0.007
(0.004)***
0.255
(0.001)***
-0.148
(0.000)***
0.072
(0.000)***

0.107
(0.036)
1.474
(0.000)

Log(# of independent directors) X Urban
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of spc permanent number

-0.068
(0.000)
-0.077
(0.000)
-0.312
(0.000)***
8740

-0.461
(0.000)***
8740

1759

1759

Director Locality and CEO Compensation
The previous sections have shown that the presence of local independent directors is
negatively related to firm performance. This evidence lends support to the entrenchment
hypothesis that more social interaction between local independent directors and firm CEO
leads to a weaker board. To further explore this question, I am testing another crucial
function the directors play on the board: setting up the CEO compensation. If local directors
behave in accordance with the entrenchment hypothesis, the presence of local directors
would more likely result in higher CEO compensation and more importantly a weaker link
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between CEO compensation and firm performance. Agency theory advocates that strong
CEO incentive pay is more likely to reduce agency costs. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and
Yermack (1996) show that strong boards are associated with higher CEO incentive pay.
Westphal and Zajac(1995) illustrate that the powerful CEO seeks to recruit new directors
with similar demographic characteristics and, therefore, those directors are more friendly to
the CEOs when setting up the compensation.
In Table 11, I assess the relationship between abnormal CEO compensation and local
directors. The abnormal CEO compensation is defined as the difference between current total
CEO compensation, sum of salary and bonus, and the median industry CEO total
compensation. The industry is classified by the first two digits of the firm’s SIC code. As
control variables, I include size (log of sales), CEO-Chairman dummy, profitability (industry
adjusted ROA), and growth opportunities (depreciation over sales).

CEOCompensationit = Localit + Log(sales)it + CEOChairdummyit + ROAit + Depreciationit + εit
Table 11 has two columns, each corresponding to a different director locality
variable. As shown in the first column in Table 11, the number of local independent director
has a significant coefficient of 0.024, implying that for an additional local directors sitting on
the board, the abnormal CEO compensation increases by 0.024 million dollars. In the second
column, the coefficient for the zero local director dummy has an opposite sign and with a
coefficient of -0.04, implying 100% non-local directors would compensate CEO less than the
median CEO receives in the same industry. Overall, the result shows that local director
presence would increase the CEO total compensation.
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Table 11 Regressing CEO total compensation on director locality characteristics
# of local independent directors
Zero local independent directors indicator (0,1)
Log(sales)
Depreciation/Sales
Chair-CEO indicator(0,1)
Return on assets
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Industry-adjusted CEO compensation
0.024
(0.014)**
-0.040
(0.411)
0.429
0.440
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
0.067
0.068
(0.022)**
(0.021)**
0.091
0.091
(0.001)***
(0.001)***
1.079
1.052
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
-3.023
-3.025
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
9917
9917
0.28
0.28

In addition, the board of directors not only set up the level of CEO compensation, but
more importantly, they also set up the link between CEO compensation and firm
performance. Previous research has documented that the link is stronger when firms have
more effective boards (for instance, Yermack(1997)). In Table 12, I create the CEO
incentive variable in the spirit of Core and Guay (1999), measured by the dollar change in
the value of stock and option CEO holds from a one percentage change of firm’s stock price.
Following Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), I create the CEO incentive ratio as follows:

Onepctit = 0.01× Priceit × ( Sharesit + Optionsit )
CEOIncentiveit = Onepctit /(Onepctit + Salaryit + Bonusit )
Where shares is the number of shares the CEO holds, options is the sum of the stock
options the CEO granted, number of unexercised options and number of exercisable options.
Each regression includes the same control variables as in Table X, with the addition of the
log of board size. I then regress the CEO incentive pay on the director locality variables and
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the other controls. According to agency theory, an effective board acting in the best interest
of stockholders would create a strong link between CEO compensation and firm
performance. As shown in the column and second column, the director locality variable has a
negative sign, which implies that adding the local directors on the board would weaken the
link between CEO incentive pay and firm performance. For example, for additional local
directors on the board, the CEO incentive pay decreases by 0.003. The second column
further shows that those firms with no local directors have an increased CEO incentive pay,
with a positive coefficient of 0.037 which is significant at the 5 percent level.
In conclusion, Tables 11 and Table 12 indicate that firms with more local directors on
their boards are more likely to pay their CEOs higher levels of total compensation, thus
providing a weaker link between CEO pay and firm performance. Overall, these findings are
consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis. The potential social interactions between local
directors and CEOs make local directors less likely to play the role of watchdog on the
board. They are more likely to return favors back to CEOs by helping them to set up higher
compensation and weaken the link between incentive pay and performance.

Table 12 Regressing CEO incentives on directors’ characteristics
CEO Incentive
-0.003
(0.001)**

# of Local Independent Directors
Zero local independent directors indicator (0,1)
Log(sales)

0.057
(0.000)***
0.002
(0.453)
0.038
(0.000)***

Depreciation/Sales
Chair-CEO indicator(0,1)
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0.037
(0.00)*
0.058
(0.000)***
0.003
(0.400)
0.037
(0.000)***

Table 12 Regressing CEO incentives on directors’ characteristics (continue)

Return on assets

0.056
(0.005)***
-0.079
(0.000)***
-0.109
(0.000)***
0.282
(0.000)***
9933
0.29

Log(number of board meetings)
Log(board size)
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-Square

0.049
(0.014)**
-0.079
(0.000)***
-0.11
(0.000)***
0.265
(0.000)***
9933
0.29

Robustness Tests
In this study, I investigate the effect of proximate directors on board effectiveness. I
rely on the measure of distance between the home address and corporate headquarters to
determine whether the directors are local or distant. I decide the directors are local when they
are live within a 50 miles radius from the headquarters. This measure is reasonable given
that the actual travel time could be with in 1 hours drive. However, for the robustness check,
I excluded the observations for the directors who are living between 50 and 100 miles as
their information role can be ambivalent. The results, of the trades’ return test do not change.
Additionally, I also repeated the tests using a different measure, “SameState”, instead of the
local director indicator. The SameState variable takes the value of one if the directors live in
the same state as the corporate headquarter. Using SameState rather than distance measure,
yields qualitatively similar results. This can be partly attributed to the fact that most directors
in the same state as the headquarters are more likely to be classified as local as well in the
sample. These results are not reported here for the sake of brevity.
In addition to using a variety of local director measures, I have also used an
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alternative measure for Q. Q is a proxy of firm value widely used in the literature. Besides
the Chung and Pruitt (1994) version of Q, I also used the market-to-book measure, defined as
sum of market value of equity, book value of assets, minus common equity and then divided
by the book value of assets. Tests based on market-to-book yield qualitatively similar results
with the ones reported in the paper.

Conclusion
While many studies have examined geographic characteristics in the context of
monitoring commercial banks, venture capitalists and security analysts, to our knowledge,
this is the first study to investigate the role of geographic characteristics in the context of
board effectiveness.
I extend the literature of geographic proximity and information advantage by
examining the difference in performance between trades of local independent directors and
distant directors. The empirical tests’ results support the notion that the local advantage
previously recorded in the context of analysts, mutual fund investors, and individual
investors also appears to exist in the context of the board of directors. On average, local
director trades significantly outperform those by distant directors. Moreover, the local
directors’ advantage becomes stronger in smaller firms and firms followed by fewer analysts.
I further analyze the effect of director locality on board effectiveness. The efficiency
hypothesis predicts that the presence of local directors would enhance board effectiveness
and hence improve the firm’s Q and ROA. On the other hand, the entrenchment hypothesis
posits that more social interaction between local directors and CEO would make local
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directors weak monitors. Thus, more local directors would weaken the board and lower Q
and ROA. The presence of local directors significantly reduces both Q and ROA. Our
empirical tests support the notion that the local directors play a weak role on the board.
Finally, I test how directors’ locality affects the CEO compensation level and
incentive pay. Agency theory suggests that higher incentive pay would help align the interest
of CEO and stockholders. An effective board would be associated with a strong link between
CEO pay and their performance, i.e., a higher proportion of incentive pay. The results show
when there are more local directors on the board, firms are inclined to pay a higher level of
compensation and lower proportion of incentive pay.
Overall, my results show strong relations between director locality and firm
performance and CEO compensation, suggesting that director geographic characteristics play
an important role in the effectiveness of corporate boards. These findings are of special
interest to both law makers as well as researchers by highlighting the effect of the geographic
characteristics of corporate boards on board effectiveness and firm performance.
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Essay 2 ⎯ Director Incentives and Earnings Management
Introduction
A well-functioning corporate board is generally considered an important disciplinary
mechanism that monitors managers and helps align the scope of their decision making with
the interests of stockholders. Therefore, monitoring by the board of directors has an
important effect on the economic performance of organizations (Jensen (1989)). However,
how to motivate board directors to monitor instead of forming alliances with the managers
has been the subject of ongoing debate. Previous research has focused on the importance of
directors’ reputation concerns8. In this study, my primary focus is on directors’ incentive
compensation. According to Compustat ExecuComp Database, there were 274 firms that
paid directors with stock options in 1992, while the figure climbs to 1,214 in 2002 but then
drops again to 1,055 in 2004. During the same period, about 660 firms never paid directors
with stock options and another 102 firms stopped awarding stock options to their directors.
These changes in director compensation structure pose an interesting empirical question.
Does the incentive pay matter in terms of motivating directors to monitor managers? If yes,
how do changes in the form of compensation affect directors’ behavior? Earlier research on
the impact of equity-based incentive compensation, such as stocks and stock option, on
managerial behavior remains inconclusive. Jensen and Meckling(1976) suggested that firms
suffering from the agency problem resulting from the separation of management and control
can use incentive compensation to help align the interests of the CEO and stockholders.
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Several subsequent empirical studies have provided support for this notion. For example,
Morck, Shelifer and Vishny (1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive
relation between Tobin’s Q and inside director shareholdings. Warfield et al. (1995) show a
negative link between managerial stockholdings and the absolute value of abnormal accruals.
They interpret their results as being consistent with managerial shareholdings acting as a
disciplinary mechanism. However, incentive compensation may also induce executives to
become short-term oriented, causing more severe agency problems. For example, Burns and
Kedia (2006) find that the firms are more likely to misreport accounting information if the
sensitivity between CEO’s compensation and stock prices is high. Bergstresser and
Philippon (2006) show that when the CEO’s incentive pay ranks near the top decile, the
CEO is likely to sell more shares and exercise more stock options in the current year. In the
same vein, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Yermack (1997) show that CEOs manage
investors’ earnings expectations downward prior to scheduled stock option awards in order
to increase the future value of their awards. Taken together, the empirical evidence suggests
that if the CEO manages earnings to increase his overall compensation, then there will be a
positive relation between CEO incentive and earnings management.
While a large body of research on executive equity incentives exists, there is less
research on the effect of the form of compensation on directors’ behavior. Unlike CEO’s, the
directors’ compensation contract that govern their continued participation in board activities
are relatively less important than their other sources of income. In addition, directors’
investment portfolios are more diversified than that of CEOs since director compensation is
rarely the only source of income. Nevertheless, directors’ compensation is sizeable
(Yermack(2004)), especially for directors that sit on multiple corporate boards (Fich and
8

For example, Fama(1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Ofek and Yermack(2000).
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Shivdasani (2006) and Ferris and Jagannathan et al. (2003)). This suggests that as is the case
with managers, the director’s compensation structure might also provide a mechanism that
fosters an alignment of interests with shareholders.
In this study I empirically address how elements of director compensation structure
affect directors’ monitoring behavior. Specifically, I test whether directors’ incentive pay
affects the level of firms’ earning management. If incentive pay induces directors to act as
monitors, then earnings management is likely to be negatively related to the directors’
incentive pay. This study is in the strand of research of Fich and Shivdasani(2005) and Byard
and Li(2005). Fich and Shivdasani(2005) show that firms that offer stock options to their
directors’ exhibit higher market to book ratios. Moreover, outside directors’ appointments
produce near zero abnormal returns for firms with option plans but significantly negative
abnormal returns for firms without them. Fich and Shivdasani (2005) indicate that stockoption plans help to align the interests of outside directors and shareholders. However, Byard
and Li(2005) argue that when stock options are used as a common component of the
compensation to the CEOs and directors, they can compromise directors’ independence and
ability to monitor CEO’s option timing opportunities. Consequently, one can argue that
awarding stock options to directors may reduce their incentives to monitor and therefore
allow CEOs to manipulate earnings.
Prior studies have found that board characteristics are associated with the level of
firms’ earnings management. For example, Klein (2002), among others, shows a negative
relation between the independence of the auditing committee of the board and abnormal
accruals. However, her study does not account for the potential conflict arising from stock
option grants to board directors and how it affects the relationship between directors’
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compensation and earnings management.
In this paper, I empirically investigate whether directors’ incentive pay affects the
firm’s earnings management using a sample of S&P 500, S&P middle cap 400 and S&P
small cap 600 firms. Following previous researchers (i.e. Jones (1991), Teoh, Welch and
Wong (1998)), I estimate the abnormal discretionary accruals from a group of cross sectional
regressions estimated by year and industry. I find that earnings management is more severe
among firms paying their directors with a higher proportion of stock options. This result still
holds when I control for firm fixed effects. I further examine how board characteristics and
CEO incentives pay jointly determine earnings management. Conditioning on director
incentives the firm paid, I show earnings management is significantly larger for firms with
high level of CEO incentive pay than for firms with low CEO incentive pay, but only when
directors’ incentive compensation is high as well.
In the tests, I also control for self-selection bias. Specifically, it is possible that firms
that have never paid stock options to their directors during the entire sample period could
also be more likely to have a specific governance mechanism in place that would affect the
level of firm’s earnings management. After controlling for self selection bias, I find firms
that awarded their board with stock options engage in more severe earnings management
than those that never paid their directors with stock options. Moreover, after controlling for
bias, the degree of earnings management is still positively related to the proportion of
incentive pay the directors received.
These results suggest that the interests of directors who receive higher levels of
incentive pay tend be closely aligned with those of the CEO rather than the shareholders. I
also examine directors’ option sales for the years following severe earnings management.
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The findings show large and significant options sales by directors following the years when
the firm’s earnings management is in the top tercile of the sample firms. This is additional
evidence in line with the notion that directors may join the CEO in an effort to manipulate
the earnings so that they could maximize their benefit from exercising their options for the
purpose of profiting or diversification.
This paper sheds new light on the relationship between director incentive
compensation and earnings management. Specifically the results show a positive relationship
between director incentive pay and earnings management, suggesting that incentive pay may
compromise the board’s independence. Second, it provides an interpretation for the recent
years’ phenomenon wherein firms decide to pay less incentive pay to the board of directors.9
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents related literature and hypotheses.
Section 2 describes data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the results.
Section 4 presents robustness tests and Section 5 concludes.

Literature Review
Earnings Management
Healey and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as a process where
“managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported
accounting numbers.” Many researchers have shown evidence that earnings management is
used to make firm’s financial statement look more optimistic. For example, Teoh, Welch and
Wong (1989) show that firms are more likely to increase accruals before they go public or

45

issue seasoned equity offerings.
It is argued that the management’s use of earnings management has both costs and
benefits. Benefits include potential improvements in managements’ credible communication
of private information to external stockholders (Healey and Wahlen (1999)). A similar
statement was also appeared in the financial press, “the CEOs know that investors hate
surprises, so they try to keep net income trending up a nice straight slop…” (Fortune 1989,
196). Goel and Thakor (2003) propose that uninformed liquidity investors are more likely to
hold stocks with less volatile earnings as the informed investors make profits from their
inside information when the earnings are more volatile. In this context, smoothing earnings
by borrowing earnings from the next year when current earnings are actually low, or lending
earnings when the previous year earnings are exceptionally high may provide a manipulative
way to convince investors to hold on to the stock. This practice could also be beneficial to
the firm because it reduces the variance of the firms’ observed earnings and thus reduces the
cost of borrowing (Trueman and Titman (1999)). However, this argument relies on
unrealistic economic and behavior assumptions. Watts (1982) argues that the investors are
sophisticated enough to be able to undo such manipulations. Thus, the usefulness of CEOs’
manipulation of earnings for the sake of reducing earnings variance is suspect.
Recent empirical research has also highlighted the costs of earnings management.
Beneish and Vargus (2002) find that abnormally high accruals are associated with increases
in insider sales of shares but after the “event period”, stock returns tend to be poor. Recent
work focusing on how CEO compensation is related to earnings management shows that
CEOs are more likely to use earnings management to inflate stocks prices and thus affect
their own wealth. For example, Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Bergstresser and Philippon
9

See Wall Street Journal Feb 24, 2003. pg. R.4 for a special report on Corporate Governance
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(2006) provide evidence that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported
earnings is more pronounced among firms where the CEO’s potential total compensation is
more closely tied to the value of the stock and option holdings. Francis, Nanda and Olsson
(2007) use discretional accruals as a proxy for earnings quality and show that higher
abnormal discretional accruals are positively related to the firm’s cost of capital, and that
cost of capital has no effect on the voluntary disclosure in the presence of earnings
management measures. Their evidence further shows that higher accruals are more likely to
be associated with insider sales of shares or options.

Director Incentives
Previous research documented that career and reputation concerns are constitute an
important disciplinary mechanism that induces directors to act in the best interest of the
shareholders. For example, Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that labor market pressure and
concerns for reputation will lead directors to fulfill their duty. Consistent with this argument,
a handful of studies show that vigilant directors that establish reputations as good monitors
are expected to be rewarded with additional board seats in the labor market, while lax
monitors are expected to be penalized with a reduction in board seats. For example, outside
directors hold fewer board seats after serving in dividend-reducing firms (Kaplan and
Reishus (1990), in companies that experience financial distress (Gilson (1990)), and in firms
that perform poorly (Yermack(2004)). In contrast, CEOs from firms that have performed
well receive outside directorships after retirement (Brickley, Coles, and Linck (1999)).
Using a sample of 111 public firms that either filed for bankruptcy or privately
restructured their debt between 1979 and 1985, Gilson (1990) finds that, on average, only
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46% of incumbent directors remained on the board at the end of bankruptcy or debt
restructuring period. Directors who resign hold significantly fewer seats on other boards
following their departure.
Harford (2003) reports that all directors, and outside directors in particular, are
unlikely to be retained following a completed takeover offer. All target directors hold fewer
directorships in the future than a control group, suggesting that the target board seat is
difficult to replace. If we view takeover as a disciplinary action, his findings support the
notion that ineffective directors are rewarded with fewer directorship. However, this also
implies that the incumbent directors including outside directors have an incentive to resist a
takeover offer in order to keep their hard-to-replace director seats.
Yermack (2004) finds a positive relation between the company’s performance in the
previous two years and the net acquisition of new board seats by outside directors over the
four years after their appointments. Additionally, if a shorter time period is used, such
relation disappears, suggesting that the market for directors takes time to assess and
assimilate the monitoring ability of newly appointed directors.
Another strand of research posits that director compensation is an important tool for
motivating directors. The typical compensation contract of a director who typically works an
average of 150 hours a year and sometimes sits on multiple boards include an annual
retainer, board meeting fees, and restricted stock and option awards. The rationale behind the
recent trend of including stock award as part of director pay resembles the one for granting
stock options to a CEO: giving an ownership stake to the agent helps align his/her interests
with those of the owners. There is some evidence that directors who own more equity are
better monitors. Perry (1999) finds that when directors of independent boards receive
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incentive compensation, the likelihood of CEO turnover following poor performance
increases. He also shows that the likelihood of a firm adopting a stock-based incentive plan
for directors is positively related to the fraction of independent directors on the board.
In spite of the benefits of improved monitoring, director incentive compensation
could be a double edge sword, especially in light of the recent dramatic increase of the
director incentive compensations. The existing research shows that stock based
compensation can cause managers to manipulate information in order to increase their
compensation by transferring wealth from the stockholders to the managers. Byard and Li
(2005) show that when directors receive a lower portion of compensation from stock options,
the CEOs are less likely to set up the option grant date before (after) the good news (bad
news) and vise versa.. Incentive pay leads to directors’ interest being more closely tied to the
interests of the executives and reduces their incentives to monitor.

Data and Variables
Sample description
The primary sample is retrieved from IRRC. The sample period is from 1996 to 2004.
The information reported in the IRRC is then combined with data in Compustat and
Compustat ExecuComp. I exclude all financial firms with SIC 6000-6999 and require that
firms granted directors stock options in at least one year during the entire sample period. The
resulting final sample contains 6837 firm-year observations.

Measures of director incentive
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The director incentive measure is defined as the proportion of incentive pay over the
director’s total compensation during the given year. IRRC reports the directors committee
membership, director classification, shares owned, pension and annual compensation.
Directors receive compensation in the form of cash, stock and options. Since most company
disclosures for directors’ equity pay are less detailed when compared with those for
executives, the basic terms of these awards such as the date, the stock price when awarded,
vesting, or restrictions on sale are often unavailable for directors. I therefore follow Yermack
(2006) and make a range of assumptions for valuing equity compensation and its incentive
features. I assume all stock options are awarded at-the-money with 10 year lives. I first value
options using the Black–Scholes method. Volatility and dividend yields for each firm-year
are obtained for the vast majority of observations from the ExecuComp database. Then I
compute total compensation by summing up the option value, annual retainer, board meeting
fee and value of restricted stock. The director incentive variable is finally obtained by
dividing the option value from the total compensation of the director.

Measures of earnings management
I use data from firms’ reported income statements to compute accrual measures. My
method closely follows that of Dechow et al. (1995), which estimates discretionary accruals
from regressions of total accruals on changes in sales and on property, plant, and equipment
(PPE) within industries.
I obtained accounting information from the Compustat Annual Industrial,
Research and Full Coverage files. All firm-year observations should satisfy the following
criteria: (1) domestic firms; (2) firms with non missing values for sales, total assets, net
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income before extraordinary items, and cash from operations; (4) non-financial firms.
Ultimately, I am able to estimate discretionary accruals for 57,903 firm-year observations
over the period from 1996 and 2004.
To determine discretionary accruals, I first run the following cross-sectional OLS
regression for each combination of calendar year and two-digit SIC code with a minimum of
8 observations to estimate coefficients b0, b1, and b2.
TAC jt
TA j , t −1

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ ΔSALES jt
= b0 ⎜
⎟ + b1 ⎜
⎜ TA j , t −1 ⎟
⎜ TA j , t −1
⎝
⎠
⎝

⎞
⎛ PPE jt ⎞
⎟ + b2 ⎜
⎟ + ε jt
⎟
⎜ TA j , t −1 ⎟
⎠
⎝
⎠

where j indexes firms, t indexes time, Total accruals(TAC) equals Net Income (Compustat
item #172) minus Cash Flow from Operations (#308). ΔSales is the changes in sales revenues
(#12), PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment (#7). All variables used here are scaled by
total assets(TA) at the beginning of the period (#6) to reduce heteroskedasiticity. I estimate the
earning using cross-sectional models. I then use the estimated coefficients to calculate
nondiscretionary accruals (NDTAC) as follows:

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ ΔSALES it − ΔARit
NDTAC it = bˆ0 ⎜
+ bˆ1 ⎜
⎟
⎜ TA ⎟
⎜
TAi , t −1
⎝ i , t −1 ⎠
⎝

⎞
⎛ PPE it ⎞
⎟⎟ + bˆ2 ⎜⎜
⎟⎟
TA
1
,
−
i
t
⎠
⎝
⎠

where, AR is the dollar value of Accounting Receivable (#2)
Thus, I can derive discretionary accruals (DTAC) as:
⎛ TAC it ⎞
− NDTAC it
DTAC it = ⎜
⎜ TA ⎟⎟
⎝ i , t −1 ⎠

Since earnings manipulation involves both positive and negative discretional accruals, I use
the absolute value of discretional accruals to measure the level of earnings management of
the firm. To reduce possible problems from outliers, I also winsorize the absolute
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discretional accrual variable at the 1% level. 10 As all the variables are scaled by total assets
at the beginning of the period, the magnitude of a firm’s discretionary accruals is indicated
as a percentage of the firm’s assets.

Measures of option sale
I also collect the data on board directors’ option sales from Thomas Financial Insider
Trading database. I gather option sales by directors in each calendar year and scaled it by the
firm’s shares of outstanding.

Other control variables
Other control variables I retrieve to explain the firm’s earnings management behavior
are profitability, size, market to book, financial leverage, institutional ownership and current
growth.
Profitability is proxied by ROA, which is obtained as the net income scaled by the
total assets at the beginning of fiscal year. Firms that are more profitable have less incentive
to adjust the earnings upward to cover a financial problem and thus suggest a negative
relationship between ROA and abnormal accruals.
Large firms are followed by more external capital markets and receive more analyst
coverage while small firms are less like to receive scrutiny about their accounting statement.
This indicates a negative relationship between earnings management and size (Dechow et
al.(1995)).
Institutional investors serve as the external monitors. The firms with large
institutional ownership would be less likely to hide their earnings with abnormal accruals
10

The results are consistent even when we do not winsorize the accrual measures.
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(Chung et al. (2002)). Similar to institutional investors, the control of the book leverage,
proxied by the total long term debt over the total assets, implies a negative relationship as
firms will receive closer scrutiny from lenders when the debt level is high. But on the other
hand, firms will have more incentive to adjust earnings because they do not want to lead to a
debt-covenant violation when the performance is poor and thus miss earnings target set by
the lenders (DeFond and Park (1997)).
Previous studies also argue that earnings management is an interaction between the
current stockholders and future stockholders (Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2005)).
Although its effect on the earnings management is not clear, I control it with the current asset
growth, which is defined as change of total assets scaled by the total assets at the beginning
of fiscal year
Firms with higher growth rate are more likely to overinvest in current assets in
anticipation of future growth of sales. This practice leads to a positive relationship between
earnings management and growth rate. The growth rate is proixed by the market to book
ratio.

Descriptive statistics
Table 13 provides descriptive statistics for the director compensation, director
incentive and earnings management measures. Panel A presents details of the director
compensation variable. Across 6,839 firm-year observations, the mean annual retainer is
$22,260, with a standard deviation of $14,700. The Annual meeting fee, the product of
number of board meetings and meeting fee, has a mean value of $7,740 with a standard
deviation of $7,380. On average, restricted stock, while reflects the value of the restricted
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stock newly issued when the board meeting holds, is $2,840 per year. The option awards
accounts for the largest part of the director compensation. Based on the Black-Scholes
formula, the option value stands at $103,160 for an average director in the sample. The
variation of the option pay is substantial, as indicated by a standard deviation of $262,180.
To further assess how the average level of director incentive and earnings
management varies over time and with one another, I also provide their mean values for each
year from 1996 to 2004 in Panel B and C, respectively. As shown in Panel B, the option
portion of the payment in director compensation climbs each year from 1996 until it peaked
in 2002 and then started to decline.
Panel C shows the yearly distribution of the mean absolute discretionary accrual. In
2000 and 2004, the evidence indicates a severe earnings management problem on average
with absolute discretional accruals of 0.21 and 0.28 respectively. However, the median
shows a more consistent pattern of earnings management over time, thus suggesting that the
mean values could be reflective of extreme outliers.

Table 13 Descriptive statistics of earnings management
and incentive measure by years
Panel A: Board director Compensation (in $ thousand)

Annual Retainer
Annual Meeting Fee
Restricted Stock
Option

Sample size

Mean

Median

Standard deviation

6837
6837
5605
6694

22.26
7.74
2.84
103.16

20
7
0
41.08

14.7
7.38
8.45
262.18
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Table 13 Descriptive statistics of earnings management
and incentive measure by years(continue)

Panel B: Director Incentive
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Total

544
670
694
700
756
806
865
862
797
6694

0.39
0.47
0.49
0.51
0.53
0.56
0.59
0.55
0.53
0.52

0.37
0.52
0.55
0.57
0.58
0.62
0.67
0.61
0.61
0.58

0.33
0.33
0.33
0.32
0.34
0.33
0.31
0.3
0.33
0.33

Panel C: Absolute Discretional Accrual
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Total

544
677
730
729
785
848
865
862
797
6837

0.06
0.07
0.07
0.09
0.20
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.23
0.11

0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04

0.06
0.09
0.10
0.17
0.38
0.12
0.12
0.26
0.59
0.28

Table 14 provides summary statistics on main variables and a first look at whether
measures of director incentive and earnings management are correlated. Averaging across all
firm-year observations, the mean (median) absolute discretionary accrual is 0.12 (.04) and
the sample standard deviation is 0.39. The mean (median) director incentive is 52% (58%) of
the director’s total compensation, with a standard deviation of 0.33. The correlation between
director incentive and absolute discretionary accruals is 0.08, significantly at the 1% level,
which suggests that a higher portion of incentive pay in the director compensation is related
with a more severe earnings management problem. The absolute discretionary accruals are
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also negatively correlated with ROA, which indicates that profitable firms have less severe
earnings manipulation problems. The director incentive measure is negatively correlated
with the book to market ratio.

Table 14 Summary statistics and correlations of earnings management
and incentive measures
Panel A
Sample size

Mean

Median

Standard deviation

Absolute discretionary accrual

6837

0.12

0.04

0.39

Director incentive

6694

0.52

0.58

0.33

ROA

6836

0.03

0.05

0.18

Book to market

6830

0.53

0.43

0.52

Total asset(in million dollars)

6837

4690.38

1149.74

15747.08

Asset growth

6836

0.14

0.07

0.38

Institutional ownership

6837

0.62

0.63

0.17

Panel B
Correlation(p-value)
Director
incentive
Absolute discretionary accrual
Director incentive
ROA

0.08
(0.00)
1.00

ROA
-0.18
(0.00)
-0.02
(0.14)
1.00

Book to market
Total asset(in million dollars)
Asset growth
Institutional ownership
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Book to
market

Total
asset

Asset
growth

Institutional
ownership

-0.02
(0.11)
-0.16
(0.00)
0.09
(0.00)
1.00

-0.02
(0.12)
-0.12
(0.00)
0.09
(0.00)
-0.04
(0.00)
1.00

0.08
(0.00)
0.10
(0.00)
0.14
(0.00)
-0.13
(0.00)
0.06
(0.00)
1.00

0.01
(0.55)
0.17
(0.00)
0.12
(0.00)
-0.09
(0.00)
0.08
(0.00)
0.09
(0.00)
1.00

Empirical Results
Univariate Analysis
In Table 15, I test for differences in earnings management across groups of firms formed after sorting on different variables
of interest. More specifically, I sort by director incentives, ROA, market to book ratio, log(market value), institutional ownership,
and book leverage, and test for differences of mean values of earnings management across the highest tercile and lowest tercile
groups. For example, after sorting firms in the top and bottom tercile of director incentive, the mean earnings management is shown
separately for the sub-samples of high-director incentive firms and low-director incentive firms.

Table 15 Univariate analysis

High Group
Low Group
Difference
P-value

Director
incentive
0.144
0.083
0.061
(0.000)

ROA

Market to book

0.107
0.133
-0.026
(0.000)

0.139
0.079
0.060
(0.000)

Log(market
value)
0.111
0.121
-0.009
(0.289)
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Asset growth
0.121
0.117
0.005
(0.558)

Institutional
ownership
0.102
0.125
-0.024
(0.000)

Book leverage
0.098
0.135
-0.037
(0.000)

Not surprisingly, firms with high market to book ratio have significantly higher
earnings management than firms with low market to book ratio (0.139 versus 0.079). This
difference is also statistically significant (p-value=0.000). Earnings management is also
larger for high director incentive than for low director incentive stocks, and the difference is
also statistically significant at 1% level. This finding provides preliminary evidence that
stock option pay for directors may provide encouragement, or at least tolerance, for earnings
management. Earnings management is much higher for low than for high institutional
ownership firms (0.125 versus 0.102), consistent with the view that institutional investors act
as external monitors, thereby reducing earnings management. Overall, the evidence from
table 3 is consistent with that of the correlation evidence found in Table 2. However, this
univariate analysis is still not sufficient enough to draw definitive conclusions as it does not
control for many other variables simultaneously. Thus, the next section proceeds with a
series of multivariate tests to further examine the relationship between directive incentive
pay and earnings management.

Regressing earnings management on director incentives
Table 16 provides multivariate regression analysis of the effect of director option
compensation on earnings management. I control for ROA market-to-book, size (log of
market value), asset growth, institutional ownership, book leverage, year dummies (not
reported), and Fama-French 48 industry dummies (not reported). The White’s (1980) method
is used to control for heteroskedasticity, and all p-values are reported with robust standard
errors. The regression is clustered at the individual firm level to reduce the serial correlation
across each firm over different years.
The first column contains the OLS regression and the second column the fixed effects
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regression results. The findings are consistent with the univariate evidence in Tables 2 and 3.
Specifically, the coefficient for director incentive is 0.023, and statistically significant with a
p-value of 0.017. This result shows that when director incentives increase by 1, earnings
management will increase by 0.023. Or put another way, if the percentage of option
compensation to total compensation increases from 50% to 80%, which is about 1 standard
deviation change of director incentive, the earnings management will increase by 0.69%.
Given that the absolute discretionary accrual is scaled by total assets at the beginning of each
year, 0.69% represents a $3.236 million increase in discretionary accruals on average. In
line with the univariate analysis, ROA, institutional ownership and leverage have significant
negative effects on the firm’s earnings management, while market to book and asset growth
have a positive impact on earnings management. Overall, the result suggests that the firms
are more likely to manipulate their earnings when the directors are paid with higher incentive
compensation.
Table 16 Director incentives and earnings management
Dependent variable: absolute discretionary accrual
Director incentive
ROA
Market to book
Log(market value)
Asset growth
Institutional ownership
Book leverage
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Number of standard and poor's identifier

OLS

Fixed Effect

0.023
(0.017)**
-0.216
(0.000)***
0.005
(0.035)**
-0.001
(0.715)
0.070
(0.000)***
-0.043
(0.043)**
-0.034
(0.066)*
6665
0.22

0.080
(0.000)***
-0.283
(0.000)***
0.006
(0.006)***
-0.014
(0.091)*
0.096
(0.000)***
0.014
(0.775)
-0.066
(0.020)**
6665
0.08
1281
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Board characteristics and earnings management
Klein (2005) and Xie et al. (2003) show that a more independent board may lead to
lower earnings management and that an independent auditing committee may also reduce
earnings manipulations. Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian (2008) further show that an effective
governance structure, such as more independent board, will decrease the earnings
management. Thus, the analysis in Table 17 controls for different board characteristics. In
particular, the following variables are added: a board independence indicator that is equal to
1 if over 51% of board members are independent; the percent of independent directors on the
auditing committee; an auditing committee independence indicator variable; and an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the auditing committee is 100% independent. In all four regressions
shown in Table 5, director incentive pay shows a significant positive relationship with
earnings management. The coefficients for director incentives range from 0.023 to 0.027 and
are statistically significant at the 5% level. The board characteristics variables are not
statistically significant. Thus, these findings provide further evidence that stock option pay
for directors is associated with higher earnings management, even after controlling for other
important board characteristics.
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Table 17 Director incentives and earnings management: controlling for board characteristics
Dependent variables: Absolute discretional accrual
Director incentive

0.023
(0.017)**
-0.216
(0.000)***
0.005
(0.035)**
-0.001
(0.732)
0.070
(0.000)***
-0.042
(0.046)**
-0.034
(0.067)*
-0.002
(0.715)

ROA
Market to book
Log(market value)
Asset growth
Institutional ownership
Book leverage
Independent board (0,1) indicator
% independent directors on the audit committee

0.027
(0.019)**
-0.203
(0.000)***
0.004
(0.053)*
-0.002
(0.429)
0.074
(0.000)***
-0.050
(0.038)**
-0.032
(0.127)

0.028
(0.017)**
-0.204
(0.000)***
0.004
(0.054)*
-0.002
(0.433)
0.074
(0.000)***
-0.048
(0.044)**
-0.032
(0.133)

0.027
(0.020)**
-0.203
(0.000)***
0.004
(0.053)*
-0.002
(0.444)
0.074
(0.000)***
-0.050
(0.036)**
-0.032
(0.128)

0.016
(0.309)

Independent auditing committee (0,1) indicator

-0.001
(0.919)

100% independent directors on the auditing committee (0,1) indicator
Observations

6665

5454

5456

0.008
(0.269)
5456

Adjusted R-squared

0.22

0.24

0.24

0.24
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CEO incentive and earnings management
Previous studies, such as Peasnell et al. (2005), have documented that board directors
help constrain earnings management, while Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) show that
firms with high CEO incentive pay are likely to be involved in high levels of earnings
management. Table 18 presents univariate analysis of CEO incentives on earnings
management conditioning on the director incentive. I assign firm into three terciles after
sorting on director incentive. Within each director incentive tercile, I further segmented the
data into three sub-terciles after sorting on the CEO incentive pay, which is measured as the
proportion of CEO option compensation over the CEO total compensation. The result shows
that when director incentive pay is in the low or median tercile, there is no significant
difference in earnings management between the high CEO tercile and the low CEO tercile
subgroups. However, when the director incentive is in the high tercile, the differences in the
earnings management between the high CEO incentive tercile and low CEO incentive tercile
subgroups is about 0.053, which is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. This
evidence that CEO incentive pay has an impact on earnings management only when director
incentive is high, lends support to the notion that the directors are more likely to form an
alliance with CEO in manipulating earnings.

Table 18 Univariate test: directors’ incentives and earnings management:
Controlling for CEO incentives
Absolute Discretional Accruals
Low Director Incentive
Low Tercile CEO Incentive
High Tercile CEO Incentive
Difference
P-Value

(1)
0.089
0.081
0.008
(0.778)
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(2)
0.078
0.084
-0.006
(0.280)

Table 18 Univariate test: directors’ incentives and earnings management:
Controlling for CEO incentives (continue)
Median Director Incentive
Low Tercile CEO Incentive
High Tercile CEO Incentive
Difference
P-Value
Low Tercile CEO Incentive
High Tercile CEO Incentive
Difference
P-Value

0.104
0.094
0.010
(0.755)

0.077
0.084
-0.007
(0.202)

High Director Incentive
0.115
0.091
0.168
0.149
-0.053
-0.058
(0.001)***
(0.000)***

To further address the concern on the effect of director incentive on constraining
CEO’s earnings manipulation. I sort the sample into three terciles by the CEO incentive and
then run the main regressions discussed in Section 3.2. The result is not reported for the sake
of brevity, the coefficients of director incentives are only statistically significant for the
subsample where CEO incentive is at the top terciles. When CEO incentives are at lower or
middle tercile, director incentives are not significant. This confirms that the director
incentive affects earnings management only when CEO incentive and director incentive are
high.
Further, I add two control variables: high director incentive high CEO incentive
dummy and low director incentive high CEO incentive dummy. As shown in table 18, the
result indicates that although the director incentive is still significantly positive, but the
group of the company year having high directors incentive and high CEO incentives have
significantly larger absolute abnormal discretional accruals while the group with high CEO
incentive low director incentive are significantly indifferent from the other groups with low
CEO incentives in terms of earnings management. This result suggests is consistent with our
universal test. The CEO incentive does affect the firm’s abnormal discretional accruals when
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coupled with high directors’ incentives award to the board directors.

Table 19 Directors incentives and earnings management:
Controlling for CEO incentives

Director incentive
Low Director Incentive X High CEO Incentive
High Director Incentive X High CEO Incentive
ROA
Market to book
Log(sales)
Asset growth
Institutional ownership
Book leverage
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Dependent variables: Absolute discretional accrual
0.036
(0.007)***
0.002
(0.748)
0.019
(0.064)*
-0.273
(0.000)***
0.007
(0.016)**
-0.001
(0.839)
0.085
(0.000)***
-0.046
(0.083)*
-0.07
(0.000)***
0.243
(0.000)***
6670
0.19

Controlling for self selection bias
The tests thus far show that director incentive pay has a positive, significant
relationship with the degree of earnings management. However, the sample only includes
those firms that pay stock options to their directors and, thus, excludes firms that do not pay
their directors any stock options. Therefore, the previous findings could be attributed to the
lack of control for selection bias, which may exist, because the decision to pay the directors
stock options is not random. For instance, a firm that is involved in high earnings
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management would be likely to pay its directors stock options and therefore, based on the
sample criteria, it would be included in the sample. The director incentive effect on earnings
management could be distorted without controlling for self-selection biases. To address this
issue, I first conduct a univariate test by comparing earning management across the
subsample of firms that pay their directors with stock options and firms that do not award
any options at all.

Table 20 Earnings management for incentive vs. no incentive paid companies
Absolute discretional accrual
N

Mean

Median

Incentive paid companies

6837

0.109

0.042

Non-incentive paid companies

1894

0.084

0.034

0.026

0.008

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

Difference

As shown in Table 20, there are 1894 firm-year observations with no incentive pay to
directors. When I compare the average earnings management between these two groups, I
see that non-incentive paying companies have mean absolute discretional accruals of 0.088
in contrast to 0.119 for the incentive paying companies. The difference of the mean absolute
discretional accruals is statistically significant as supported by a t-statistic of 3.144. Looking
at the median value of the absolute discretional accrual also leads to the same conclusion.
The median absolute discretional accrual is 0.042 for incentive paying firms and the median
absolute discretional accrual for non incentive paying companies is 0.034.
To address the self-selection bias issue, we use a two-stage Heckman selection model
that controls for the probability of a firm paying directors incentive compensation. The first
stage is a probit regression to estimate the probability of the firm awarding the directors with
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a stock option plan. The predicted probability of paying incentive options obtained from the
first stage regression will be added as a control variable in the second stage regression.
In the first stage probit regression, the dependent variable is an incentive paid dummy
that is equal to one if the firm pays directors incentive pay, or zero otherwise. Following
Fich and Shivdasani (2005), I include the following control variables that could help explain
the firm’s decision to award directors with stock options: board independence dummy, the
natural logarithm of one plus the annual retainer, new CEO dummy, CEO of retirement age
dummy, an indicator of whether the directors receive a pension plan, percentage of directors
who are CEOs in other firms, CEO-chairman dummy, dividend yield, market adjusted stock
return for the last 12 months and the natural logarithm of sales. The results, shown in Table
21, indicate that , the firm is more likely to pay directors with stock options when it has a
more independent board, the director annual retainer is high, and the CEO is new and at
retirement age. This result is consistent with the findings of Fich and Shivdasani (2005).
Directors are reluctant to adopt stock option plan in their compensation package as the stock
option will make their portfolio less diversified and thus more risky. When the cash-based
annual retainer is high, the board is more likely to adopt the stock option plan. The more
independent the board, implying less insider ownership, the more likely it is to adopt the
stock option plan. But when the CEO also chairs the board, the board is less likely to adopt
the stock option plan. This result is not in conflict with the relationship between board
effectiveness and earnings management. It shows that more independent boards are more
likely to adopt the stock option plan, but we fail to conclude that independent boards lead to
severe earnings management. Thus, our study is not inconsistent with some other studies
have shown that independent boards can help reduce earnings management (for example, see
Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian (2008)).
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The second stage regression test includes previously employed control variables and
the predicted probability to pay directors incentive compensation from the first stage
regression as a new control variable. The coefficient of the fitted value of director incentive
is still strongly significant. Moreover, compared to our previous results, the coefficient has
increased from 0.023 to 0.043, which is about 100% larger in magnitude. The predicted
probability of incentive pay is significant but with a positive sign, which is consistent with
the univariate analysis findings. The results show that firms without incentive pay, on
average, have lower earnings management than those firms which paid directors with
incentive compensation. In addition, the lambda statistics from the selection model has a
negative coefficient of -0.095 and significant at 0.000 level, which indicates that selection
biases exists and the result has a downward biases without controlling the firm’s probability
to pay directors incentive compensation. This self-selection test supports our result that the
earnings management is more severe when the directors receive incentive compensation
even after we control the factors that affect the firm’s decision to provide incentive
compensation, the coefficient of director incentive compensation variable moves up from
0.02 to 0.043.

Table 21 Earnings management for incentive vs. no incentive paid companies:
self selection analysis
Dependent variable: Absolute discretional
accrual
First stage (Incentive
paid dummy)

Second stage

Director incentives

0.043

ROA

(0.000)***
-0.266
(0.000)***
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Table 21 Earnings management for incentive vs. no incentive paid companies:
self selection analysis (continue)
Market to book

0.007
(0.000)***
0.001
(0.685)
0.073
(0.000)***
-0.032
(0.066)*
-0.053
(0.000)***
0.143
(0.000)***

Log(market value)
Asset growth
Institutional ownership
Book leverage
Predicted incentive paid (0,1) indicator
Independent board (0,1)indicator

0.247
(0.000)***
0.124
(0.000)***
0.147
(0.017)**
0.185
(0.000)***
-0.063
(0.279)

Log(1+annual retainer)
New CEO
CEO of retirement age
Pension plan to director
Percentage of directors who are CEOs of other
firm

0.280
(0.052)*
-0.111
(0.002)***
-0.133
(0.615)
0.023
(0.337)
-0.067
(0.000)***
-0.095
(0.000)***
8533

CEO chairs the board
Dividend yield
Market adjust 12-month stock return
Log(sales)
Lambda statistics
Observations

8533

Earnings management and directors option sale
The evidence thus far is consistent with the notion that director incentive pay inhibits
the director’s monitoring effectiveness and thus leads to higher level of earnings
management. Next, I investigate whether directors understand and take advantage of the high
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earnings management activity of the firm. I collect information on directors’ options sale for
the year t+1 for all sample firms. The dependent variable is total director options realized in
year t+1. The control variables are a high-earnings management dummy that takes the value
of 1 if the firm’s earnings management is in the top tercile in year t, change of cash flow
(#308), market return and log(sales). In the first column of Table 10, the coefficient for the
high-earnings management dummy is 0.067, significant at the 5% level. When all other
control variables are included, the coefficient is 0.059, significant at the 10% level. This
finding indicates that for firms with earnings management level in the top tercile in the
previous year, the current year directors’ options realization increases by approximately 0.06
to 0.07.

Table 22 Earnings management and insider sell

Absolute discretional accruals (Top Tercile)
Stock market return
Change of cash flow
Log(sales)
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Directors Option Sell

Directors Option Sell

0.059
(0.060)*
-0.008
(0.701)
0.288
(0.095)*
-0.127
(0.000)***
2194
0.11

0.067
(0.049)**

2196
0.05

Additional robustness tests
Given the small time variation of the director incentive, it is reasonable to assume
that firms are less likely to change the structure of the board compensation. I therefore
employ in my analysis the cumulative change of director incentives over a three year period
from year t-3 to year t. As shown in Table 23, the dependent variable is the change of
earnings management from year t-3 to year t, and all independent variables are also
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measured as changes over the same period. As in Table 4, I use year and industry dummies
to control for time and industry effects, but their coefficients are not reported for the sake of
brevity. The number of observations drops to 3195 and the overall R-square drops to 17%
from 22% in Table 4. The coefficient of director incentives is 0.07, which is about 3.5 times
of the corresponding coefficient in Table 4 and strongly significant at the 1% level. The
significance for the other variables is retained except for the coefficient of the change in
institutional ownership, which becomes insignificant.

Table 23 Cumulative change of director incentives and earnings management
Dependent variable: change of absolute
discretional accrual
Change of director incentive

0.072
(0.002)***
-0.172
(0.211)
0.008
(0.079)*
-0.032
(0.005)***
0.156
(0.000)***

Change of ROA
Change of market to book
Change of log(market value)
Change of asset growth
Change of institutional ownership

-0.026
(0.645)

Change of book leverage

-0.103
(0.011)**

Observations

3195

Adjusted R-squared

0.17

The results are robust to other sample and model specifications. For example, Table
24 focuses on a subsample of firms with independent boards, i.e., firms for which 51% or
more of the board directors are independent. The regression result, presented in column 1 in
Table 11 shows that director incentive pay affects earnings management even when the
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majority of the board are independent directors. This relationship is significant at the 1%
level. Second, I include in the sample only firms with an independent auditing committee,
i.e., firms for which 51% or more of the auditing committee members are independent
directors. The purpose of excluding all firms without an independent auditing committee is
to re-test the relationship for a subset of firms which potentially have a less severe earnings
management problem. Again, the director incentive variable is positive and significant at the
1% level. Thus, these results indicate that whether a board is independent or not does not
materially change the relationship between director incentive pay and earnings management.

Table 24 Director incentives and earnings management: sub-samples
Dependent variables: Absolute discretional accrual
Director incentive
ROA
Market to book
Log(market value)
Asset growth
Institutional ownership
Book leverage
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(1)
0.043
(0.000)***
-0.213
(0.000)***
0.005
(0.036)**
-0.000
(0.874)
0.049
(0.008)***
-0.046
(0.064)*
-0.022
(0.316)
5026
0.22

(2)
0.029
(0.003)***
-0.210
(0.000)***
0.005
(0.036)**
-0.001
(0.572)
0.063
(0.000)***
-0.048
(0.020)**
-0.035
(0.066)*
6262
0.21

I consider alternative measures of earnings management and directors incentive pay.
In the Table 25, column 1, I use the absolute discretional accrue estimated as Jone’s model.
In column 2 and 3, I used a standardized director incentive measure instead of measuring
director incentive in percentage terms. For the sake of brevity, I do not report the coefficients
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for other control variables. Table 12 shows that the result remains robust. For one standard
deviation change of director incentive, the absolute discretional accrual would change by
0.8%. Economically, this number is not small given that the average total asset is about
4,690 million dollars in the sample. A 0.8% percentage change means that 37.52 million
dollars change of absolute discretional accruals.

Table 25 Directors incentives and earnings management: alternative measures
Dependent variables: Absolute discretional accrual
Director incentive

(1)
0.024
(0.017)**

Director incentive (standardized)

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

6665
0.22

(2)

(3)

0.008
(0.017)**

0.008
(0.017)**

6665
0.22

6665
0.22

Conclusion
This paper finds that director incentive compensation has a positive and significant
relationship with the level of the firms’ earnings management. To identify the effect of the
director incentive on firm’s earnings management, I employ a series of tests that control for
self selection and provide robust evidence using alternative earnings management and
directors compensation measures. This paper contributes to two strands of research. First,
while some policymakers and researchers believe that incentive compensation for directors
may lead to an alignment of their interest with that of the stockholders, this paper shows that
high incentive pay may lead to a higher degree of earnings management. Second, previous
studies show that high CEO incentive pay would lead to high earning management, but they
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fail to control for director incentives. I find that after controlling for director incentives, it
becomes apparent that CEO incentives lead to higher earning manipulation levels only if
directors’ incentive pay is high as well.
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